Piercing the Monetary Veil

Piercing the Monetary Veil

NB: This post is part of the “Piercing the Monetary Veil” symposium. Other contributions can be found here.

Luke Herrine —

This blog has already hosted several examples of re-thinkings of the nature of money and its relationship to law and power, most recently in a symposium on LPE Contributor Mehrsa Baradaran’s book on money and Black capitalism. This may seem like a niche project that those without an interest in finance can afford to ignore or leave to others. But that would be to ignore a fundamental principle: cash rules everything around us. Especially in capitalist societies, power is channeled through money and vice versa.

And justifications of power rely on mystification about money. If anything can be called the core of the neoliberal project it is the proposition that cash should rule us. Hayek’s foundational argument, after all, is that allocation via the price mechanism is the essence self governance. Making all resources and activities interchangeable with money enables each person to pursue her own version of the good life in a way that interferes with others’ only as much as they consent to while simultaneously directing resources towards their most valuable use (see here for instance). Payment of money is how we each individually express how much we value different resources and how much of others’ interference we are willing to bear. Price is the aggregation of those individual valuations. Money thus serves as the common currency that enables us to commensurate our processes of valuation without deliberating and without forcing anything on anybody else.

But that’s not how money works. Treating money as a neutral arbiter of values that the legal system can simply take for granted is a classic example of “transcendental nonsense“. As with any form of such nonsense, explaining why requires a careful analysis of how law structures money, tracing who has the power to shape that law, and exploring the dialectic relationship between the law, money, and the markets they coordinate. A small but growing group of scholars has been undertaking this task. Many of these scholars have begun to converge in a new international network called the Law and Money Initiative. An overlapping group will also be launching a new site at just-money.org.

Over the next two weeks, we will host a symposium on how close attention to the role of money in law and political economy changes one’s analysis of a whole range of areas of society, with a particular focus on how the legal infrastructure of money shapes areas of non-financial law. The idea is to open up conversations about how power shapes law to conversations about how money and law shape each other, and vice versa.

Join us!

Luke Herrine is a PhD Student at Yale Law School.

The Curative Power of Law and Political Economy

Amy Kapczynski —

Ask not for whom the First Amendment tolls: It tolls for you.  Or so I argue in an essay just published at the Columbia Law Review online.  It’s called “The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More Democratic Political Economy”—a boring title for a vital and urgent problem.  Courts, speaking in the name of the First Amendment, are “freeing” us from regulatory approaches that have worked for decades to protect us from snake oil and inform us about the products we put in our bodies. How did we arrive here? And how might demo­cratic prerogatives retain control over the webs of commodity exchange upon which our lives depend?  The essay addresses these questions, trying along the way to model how law and political economy analysis can contribute to our understanding.

The FDA is a key accomplishment of both the Progressive Era and the New Deal and perhaps the most muscular of all federal agencies. It regulates one-fifth of the consumer economy, and has enjoyed extraordinarily high levels of influence and public trust throughout its long history.  This popularity may have something to do with the fact that the FDA gained its powers through successive waves of democratic demand for its intervention when “free markets” proved deadly.  (If you don’t know the story of thalidomide, which left a trail of destruction around the world in the 1950s and 1960s, here is a vivid introduction). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the FDA has also been a prime target of neoliberals, who resent its extensive powers.  Industry lobbying and sustained criticism from Chicago-school types and have had an impact; several recent laws have weakened the agency.  But the respect and support the FDA commands have made legislative assaults challenging.  Perhaps that is why industry—and industry funded groups—have invested in the use of the courts to attack its power.

What does that attack look like?  The cases are astonishing.  Some suggest that drug companies have a free speech right to market drugs for unproven uses.  These threaten the system that the FDA has used for decades to develop the evidence we need to understand whether drugs work.  Nonetheless, citing these cases, the FDA appears poised to substantially deregulate drug marketing.  New commercial speech doctrine may also be the demise of a law passed recently to protect consumers from misleading claims about supposedly low-risk tobacco products.   E-cigarette companies (mostly backed, apparently, by big tobacco) argue that Congress doesn’t have the power to force them to validate claims that their products are low risk, though we know relatively little about their long-term implications.

The logic of these cases could go quite a bit further, even undermining the FDA’s ability to regulate medicines and tobacco altogether.  I don’t spell out the many possible implications for food, supplements, and cosmetics, but you can read between the lines.

How did this happen?  Here’s where law and political economy offers important insights. If we read the cases that build this new commercial speech doctrine, cases like Virginia Pharmacy and IMS v. Sorrell, with the literature on neoliberalism in mind, we see that they have been deeply shaped by market supremacist thinking. They mobilize images of markets, subjects, and the state that are not only contestable, but deeply undemocratic.

How we might we best respond to this new and rather ghoulish First Amendment?  There are some excellent doctrinal arguments that could bring the courts back from the brink, as I describe in the essay.  Importantly, though, these cases should also cause us to rethink our needs for public infrastructure.  If courts thrust us into a world with more limited authority over private markets, we must envision a much more substantial role for the public—in this case, for example, by expanding public funding for health research. This approach would sidestep recent court decisions in addition to having far-reaching benefits for health democracy or health justice. It is also an instance of a broader point. By undermining public-oriented regulation of private companies, the advance of market supremacy inside of constitutional doctrine paradoxically pushes the campaign for democratic control up a level.  New public infrastructure that displaces or routes around an increasingly ungovernable private sector would, in addition to cutting out the profit-oriented middleman, more easily brush off a Lochnerized First Amendment.  The parallels to Medicare For All—spurred on by attacks to the ACA—are easy to see.

The piece was a response to the superb conference and volume on “Free Expression in an Age of Inequality” put on recently by Columbia Law School, Columbia Law Review, and the Knight Institute.  If you’ve read this far, you’re incurable, and you should also check out the other pieces published as part of the symposium, especially Jed Purdy’s “The Bosses Constitution.”  People often ask me for work describing how to “do LPE.”  These two pieces provide possible examples.

Amy Kapczynski (@akapczynski) is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School. 

The Uneasy Case Against Occupational Licensing (Part 2)

Frank Pasquale and Sandeep Vaheesan–

Successful ideological entrepreneurs change policy-makers’ focus and their presumptions. Those on the right, in particular, have been very effective at shifting attention from core confrontations of capital and labor to peripheral conflicts among laborers. We see this repeatedly in inequality policy, where fundamental tensions between capital and labor are ignored, obfuscated, or trivialized by a tidal wave of technocratic reframing. Continue reading

The Uneasy Case Against Occupational Licensing (Part 1)

Frank Pasquale & Sandeep Vaheesan–

Obama-era technocrats and Trump cronies may not agree on much, but they have made common cause against occupational licensing. That focus undermines important social objectives while obscuring far more important problems in the labor market. In this post, we cover the basics of licensing, and then reframe current attacks on it. In our next post, we will explain why licensing’s mix of consumer protection and labor market stabilization is a legitimate policy option for a wide range of occupations.

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Economic Human Rights, Not Tough Policy Tradeoffs

Martha McCluskey —

According to conventional law and economics wisdom, problems of economic inequality are best solved with targeted redistributive spending, not universal human economic rights. A political economy perspective suggests the opposite: that legal rights are crucial for economic justice.

Orthodox law and economics tellsus: all rights have a cost.  Law allocates economic gain, but cannot generate it, in this view.  From this premise, any new economic rights aimed at supporting those who are disadvantaged must come at the expense of some other economic gain.  For example, a universal right to affordable health care would simply mask an inevitable tradeoff in public and private spending:  fewer resources for education or jobs.  In addition, in this logic, an economic entitlement to receive basic human support will replace market discipline with incentives for waste, reducing economic resources overall.

What orthodox law and economics doesn’t tell us:  all costs have a right.  That is, any costs associated with new economic rights arise not from essential economics, but instead from contingent legal and political arrangements. Particular legal and political regimes produce, organize and limit access to human needs like education or health care. Law itself shapes the economic forces that appear to be disrupted when law re-allocates rights to advance general human needs.

On the question of health care, for example, a complex system of legal rights and institutions already protects economic gain for some at the expense of health and economic security for others.  Legal systems distributing risks and rewards in health care include patent rights, insurance regulation, corporate governance rules, antitrust law, criminal law, and tax policy. Moreover, these legal rights are not firmly settled or self-evident, but instead are continually questioned and modified, especially in response to lobbying, litigation, and advocacy by industry interests.  New rights to egalitarian economic support can similarly re-arrange economic gain and loss as a legitimate and beneficial function of democracy.

Further, we should not presume human economic rights amount to zero sum transfers or costly economic distortions.  That conventional law and economics thinking rests on the myth of an essential market order that transcends law and politics, thereby closing off analysis of how re-structuring the market could generate far better economic conditions.  But a more complete law and political economy view recognizes that entitlements do not come at the expense of naturally productive market activity; instead, entitlements generate and govern market production. New legal rights can give people new power to resist existing market constraints, and that transformative power can lead the economy to new levels of prosperity and stability. Continue reading

What Role for Global Finance in a Course on International Trade Law?

David Singh Grewal –

Most years, I teach an introductory course on International Trade Law. And every year since I began I’ve included a session on the international financial architecture, on the view that this architecture is intimately bound up with the functioning of the trade regime.

Euro Dollar The European Union United States

I begin the course predictably enough with a series of sessions on the history and political economy of international trade before we get into what I call the “guts of the GATT.” Here, we study the key articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the main disputes that have arisen concerning their interpretation, both before and after the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Any course on international trade law would have to introduce core elements such as “most favored nation” status (Art. I), “national treatment” (Art. III), key exceptions (for example, as elaborated in Article XX), and the main “annex agreements” of the WTO (such as the TRIPS agreement, which Amy Kapczynski has discussed on this blog), as well as the various remedies and safeguards available to states facing disruptions from international trade. But toward the end of the course, I bring my friend and colleague, Robert Hockett, to discuss the international financial architecture underpinning economic globalization as a whole.

I suspect few international trade law courses address international finance as an integral part of an introduction to trade liberalization. Given the evolution of international economic law, this choice is probably unsurprising. Neither in the treaty text of the GATT (nor in the other “annex agreements” that make up the WTO) is financial architecture explicitly regulated. By contrast with international trade law, international financial law is elaborated through a different set of governing texts, institutions, and international monetary practices—prominently, the IMF Articles of Agreement, the IMF itself, and the practices that have developed among affiliated national central banks and finance ministries. Trade law scholars may be understandably wary of bringing such complex or seemingly extraneous considerations into a course that will already be full enough.

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Whatever Happened to “Just Prices?”

Robert Hockett – 

Are prices the sort of thing that can be fair or unfair? It seems to be common to assume so. Health care is said to cost too much, unhealthy foodstuffs to cost too little. Air and water, we say, should be free. Maybe college and health insurance should be as well?

Yet while we frequently hear and say such things in informal settings, many in more ‘serious’ company appear to concede that prices can no more be fair or unfair than the number seven can be yellow or green. There are only individual preferences – my wish to pay less, your willingness to pay more – and market prices that all of us ‘take’ and don’t ‘make.’ In this foundationally critical matter, so closely bound up with the way we meet needs in a market economy, it seems we are most (if not all) of us neoclassical economists now.

But do we really have to give up the idea of fair prices? In a forthcoming paper, Roy Kreitner and I say, Not so fast. We interrogate and rehabilitate the idea of fair prices in part through a critical look at its recent history, and in part through a look at the ways in which prices are actually determined in contemporary economies. We abjure, however, any attempt to link this inquiry with ‘just price’ theory of the sort that flourished, in a number of forms, before the so-called ‘marginalist revolution’ of the late 19th century – the revolution that purported to slay what we used to call ‘political economy’ and birthed ‘economics.’

In this post I aim to fill-in that gulf and trace some connecting lines. For it turns out that our attempt at a ‘just price’ revival has a venerable and unjustly forgotten pedigree in hardcore just price theory of the pre-marginalist variety.

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