Launching 1LPE: A Law and Political Economy Approach to 1L Courses

Isra Syed & Talya Lockman-Fine —

 Many of us came to law school interested in how the law can advance social justice, only to find ourselves disoriented by a 1L curriculum seemingly uninterested (and often hostile) to these questions. We encountered the Coase theorem in torts and Pareto optimality in contracts, but were given no vocabulary to understand the politics underlying these ideas. We were told that matters of economic redistribution were irrelevant to constitutional law, without any rigorous interrogation of why and how this came to be. And we were told that the laws of the market have no bearing on racial and gender equality, despite their tremendous power in ordering modern society.

This experience convinced us that we need other modes of analysis.  For many law students, required core courses – typically including constitutional law, contracts, civil procedure, criminal law, property, and torts – are the first introduction to what the law is and how to understand it. As such, they should be our first entry point into modes of critical analysis of the law in relation to power.

Continue reading

Majority Leverage Against Minority Rule

Joseph Fishkin —

There’s a lot for liberals to despair about these days and the Kavanaugh appointment sharpened several sources of that despair. After such an intensely partisan fight about the Court, and especially after the remarkable, norm-shattering partisan performance of the Justice himself at his final confirmation hearing, some of the liberal worry is inevitably focused on questions about the Supreme Court. Should “we” favor more judicial restraint, more “taking the constitution away from the courts,” more strategies of challenging the Court through politics? These are important questions; there’s much more to say about them. (Indeed I will say more about them, with my coauthor Willy Forbath, as they relate to the project of our book.) But these questions may not be the most urgent ones right now, with an election weeks away. The most urgent ones, I think, have to do with the specter of the possibility that an emerging American majority—racially diverse, young, and well to the left of the current government on both economic and social issues—may face the prospect of living for a considerable period, perhaps much of our lives, under minority rule.

Continue reading

A Neoliberal Masterpiece?

Kate Redburn and Amy Kapczynski


In our market supremacist era, is anyone allowed to bring their full self to the marketplace and the workplace?  Or must we all be “everywhere and only homo oeconomicus,” as Wendy Brown put it?  One of the more arresting aspects of the Supreme Court’s recent Masterpiece Cakeshop case is how neoliberal it isn’t. If neoliberalism casts us all as imbued with equal dignity as consumers, and all equally debased in the workplace, Masterpiece points to a world where markets treat some of us decidedly more equally than others.

What might it mean for our understanding of how neoliberalism works, both broadly, and in relation to a Court that elsewhere shows itself soaked in neoliberal thought?

Continue reading

Using LPE to Understand For-Profit Colleges

Luke Herrine —

Betsy Devos’s Department of Education spent the summer finalizing its plans to defang Obama-era regulations strengthening consumer protection regulations of for-profit colleges. Undoing these regulations will keep federal funds flowing to companies that line investors’ pockets by imposing a lifetime of indebtedness onto working-class individuals under false pretenses. The ongoing challenges to their delay and repeal (one of which just won in district court!) are thus crucial.Image result for college

But that does not mean that we should celebrate the regulations themselves as victories for progressivism. They are a prime example of the limits that neoliberalism has imposed upon the progressive imagination. From a law and political economy perspective, it is clear that for-profit colleges have become a wealth extraction strategy in which financiers create a revenue stream by using the societal promise of class mobility as a lure to lead structurally disadvantaged individuals into unpayable debt. Shifting from a neoliberal to an LPE lens makes it clear that eliminating for-profit colleges is the first step to a truly progressive vision for the role of higher education in society.

Continue reading

“Law is Politics by Other Means?”: In Support of Differentiation

Ralf Michaels —

The struggle over Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination for the US Supreme Court and the subsequent horrible spectacle of the Senate hearings brought about a “genuine question” by a leading economist, Dani Rodrik: “how do we prevent ‘the Supreme Court has always been political’ argument from morphing into ‘judicial independence and the rule of law are political charades’?  Asking for friends in Hungary, Turkey, Poland, etc..” Several authors on this blog (here, here, and here) have given excellent answers to the question, insofar as it affects the United States.

They have been less sure, however, about what to do with the perspective of Rodrik’s “friends in Hungary, Turkey, Poland, etc..”

Continue reading

No Law Without Politics (No Politics Without Law)

Jedediah Purdy —

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, now very close to controlling the decisive vote on the Supreme Court, resembles other candidates for high political office. He has a constituency–the Federalist Society, anti-abortion activists, everyone who hopes to see Obamacare weakened and affirmative action ended–and other constituencies in opposition. Lots of MN SUPREME COURT WIKImoney is being raised and spent for and against his confirmation. He has a set of commitments that are plainly at the center of national controversies–over the issues already mentioned, and also over the role in money in politics, the future of criminal justice and environmental, and no doubt a great more that we may not exactly “know” from his judicial record, but which is pretty confidently inferred from his outlook and affiliations. His confirmation, in other words, is a lot like choosing a senator, except that he’ll be much more powerful than almost any individual senator–and never has to answer to voters, now or in the future.

Nonetheless, it has been an article of faith–or at least a relentless rhetorical trope–on both sides of the fight that “politicization” of the judiciary is a kind of corruption and crisis. What distinctive judicial or rule-of-law values draw the line between a court, with or without Judge Kavanaugh, and other aspects of politics? What does it mean to say, as Amy Kapczynski does in her opening post, that courts are political, but not in the same way that politicians are?

Amy’s answer is that courts “morph” politics into “universalizing argument,” giving reasons for their decisions that are supposed to apply to everyone, and that this helps to articulate a picture of a political community that is “ours,” that has a “we.” (She disclaims the thought, implicit in some defenses of courts, that there is anything in legality itself that will produce liberal or left-leaning results: procedure and universalizing efforts at neutrality are not, she tells us, independent of visions of justice or the good society.)

I think we have to look into the abyss and admit the possibility that politics really does come first, that the question is not for or against politicization, but what kind of politicization. My reflections are meant in a spirit of earnest joint inquiry, and of uncertainty. (As I sometimes feel obliged to say on Twitter, tweets do not imply self-endorsement.)

Continue reading

Political Courts and Democratic Politics

Samuel Moyn —

The nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court is on the knife’s edge. The stakes are higher than for the confirmation of any American judge in our lifetimes. For MN SUPREME COURT WIKIthat reason alone, it is probably not a good time to stage a general debate whether and in what sense law is something more than politics by other means. But I would conduct it by separating out the sort of high stakes judicial appointments and decisionmaking that has attracted everyone’s interest in the past few weeks.

Low stakes judicial decisionmaking is inevitably political too, obviously. Generations of critical work has established that low stakes judicial process is shot through with politics, and generally helps reproduce illicit structures, especially through criminal and private law. But if that debate will always deserve to continue, one can legitimately conclude that high stakes judicial decisionmaking is different. That it is politics by other means is much more straightforward and undeniable, and the primary question is how progressives should think about it.

Continue reading

Partisan Warriors and Political Courts

Amy Kapczynski —

Thursday’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing was a stomach churning, nauseating affair. Christine Blasey Ford laid her life on the tracks, knowing full well that trains delivering important men can rarely be stopped.  That was enough, but then came the turn:  Brett Kavanaugh, partisan warrior.  He tore into Democrats for a process almost entirely dictated by Republicans.  He seethed with explosive anger, which he weaponized to advance his own career.  He lied and evaded.  And walked away somehow having improved his chances of being appointed to the Supreme Court.


If “courts are political,” do we have grounds to object to this display?  Dani Rodrik asked a similar question on Friday in a broader frame: “How do we prevent ‘the Supreme Court has always been political’ argument from morphing into ‘judicial independence and the rule of law are political charades’?  Asking for friends in Hungary, Turkey, Poland, etc.”

The question is much deeper, as he rightly points out, than our immediate American fiasco.  And it is an urgent one for the LPE crowd, raised up as we were on the insights of legal realism and critical legal studies, yet committed – as we also are – to articulating a set of claims to the right and the good that could help make our democracies more fair and just.

In the coming days and weeks, a few of us will offer some ideas on these questions to see where our conversation might lead us.  To start us off, I’ll expand a little on the epigrammatic answer I gave to Rodrik: “In a democratic system judges are not political in the way politicians are. They must hear all comers; give reasons; express a universal principle — they morph politics and produce universalizing argument.”

Continue reading

Accounting for Incorporation: Part 2

Robert Hockett —

Introduction: From ‘Accounting For’ to ‘Accountable To’    

In an earlier post I welcomed legislation recently proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren. Her Accountable Capitalism Act, I suggested, not only bids fair in the long run to render incorporated business firms less sociopathic, but also affords in the short run a fine opportunity to recall what corporate privileges are for. The latter, I argued,


are both analytically and historically best understood as ‘publicly’ conferred advantages accorded ‘private’ entities for ‘public goods’ that they provide. This interpretation of the origin and function of the corporate form, I noted, is simply inescapable when we observe the practice of conditional corporate chartering, and the law of corporate action taken ultra vires, that predominated from the dawn of American incorporation well into the 20th century.

Unfortunately, I also noted, once the 19th century conditions of capital scarcity and unreliable public revenue that had recommended incorporation as a necessary mode of ‘outsourcing’ public functions to private entities in the first place had receded, corporate history took a darker turn. Subnational state governments that once had chartered firms conditionally to discharge public functions now began to bribe them, with a view to gleaning franchise revenue. Charters now grew unconditional and firms were treated as accountable to no one but their largest shareholders. Firms grew ever larger in this new environment, and states grew weaker and ‘divide-and-conquerable’ where holding privileged ‘private’ firms to ‘public’ account was concerned. A ‘race to the bottom’ began.

What, then, I asked, is requisite to restoration of some version of the status quo ante – the world in which the truly extraordinary privileges of perpetual existence and asset-insulation (particularly limited liability, an illuminating synonym for which would be ‘limited accountability’) were conditional upon provision of some public benefit? The answer, I suggested, would involve a number of essential measures, all of which would capitalize upon the fact that it’s our federal government now that stands to mega-firms as our state governments once stood to smaller firms. I therefore promised in a sequel post to lay those out, and then to indicate how Senator Warren’s legislation would begin to take those necessary steps.

Well then, here we go.

Continue reading